Oligopolistic competition and welfare by Ritz, Robert
                                                               
                                   
 
 
  
 
Cambridge Working Paper Economics: 1680 
 
Oligopolistic competition and welfare 
  
 
 
Robert A. 
Ritz 
  
    
19 December 2016 
 
This chapter provides a selective survey of recent developments in the study of social welfare under 
oligopoly. The main topics covered are (i) the rate of cost pass through as a tool to analyze market 
performance; (ii) the quantification of welfare losses due to market power in Cournot-style models; and 
(iii) new results from models with endogenous entry. The chapter highlights common themes across 
these topics and identi.es areas for future research. 
Cambridge Working Paper Economics 
 
Faculty of Economics 
Oligopolistic competition and welfare
Robert A. Ritz
Judge Business School & Faculty of Economics
University of Cambridge, U.K.
E-mail: rar36@cam.ac.uk
This version: December 2016
Prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory & Industrial Organization,
Luis Corchón & Marco Marini (eds.), Edward Elgar, forthcoming.
Abstract
This chapter provides a selective survey of recent developments in the study of
social welfare under oligopoly. The main topics covered are (i) the rate of cost pass-
through as a tool to analyze market performance; (ii) the quantication of welfare
losses due to market power in Cournot-style models; and (iii) new results from models
with endogenous entry. The chapter highlights common themes across these topics
and identies areas for future research.
Keywords: Oligopoly, market performance, social welfare, division of surplus, cost
pass-through, endogenous entry
JEL classications: D42 (monopoly), D43 (oligopoly), D61 (allocative e¢ ciency),
L20 (rm behavior) L40 (antitrust policy)
I am grateful to Anette Boom, Simon Cowan, Federico Etro, Pär Holmberg, Nathan Miller, Michael
Pollitt, Andrew Rhodes, John Vickers and Glen Weyl for helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining
errors are mine.
1
1 Introduction
1.1 Objectives
Market performance under imperfect competition has been a classic question for econo-
mists since the time of Adam Smith. It remains a central concern of the theoretical and
empirical industrial-organization (IO) literature and anti-trust policymakers dealing with
competition issues in practice.
The objective of this chapter is to survey recent developments in the IO theory litera-
ture that speak to oligopoly and welfare. The coverage here is explicitly selective, concen-
trating on areas where the literature has substantially progressed over the last 510 years.
Related issues have been covered extensively by several authors in the past. Valuable re-
sources remain the early survey chapter by Shapiro (1989) as well as the oligopoly-theory
books by Tirole (1988) and Vives (1999) which also contain signicant material on welfare.
The uniqueness of this chapter lies in the following. First, the focus is specically
on welfare; most other treatments deal with this only as a by-product. Second, it covers
recent developments which have not yet found their way into textbook treatments but
hopefully will do so in the near future. Third, it discusses separate strands of the recent
literature in a way that highlights their common themes.
1.2 Scope
The scope of this chapter is limited to relatively simple static oligopoly models under
partial-equilibrium analysis.1 It concentrates on theory albeit in a way that it is informed
by the empirical literature and speaks to industrial applications. Extensions to more
complex settings are dealt with by other chapters contained in this volume.
Market power lies solely with rms while buyers are atomistic; there is no price dis-
crimination. The focus is on markets with varying degrees of competitive conduct rather
than tacit collusion or price xing. Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral prot-maximizers
and are equally well informed about the market. There are no other market failures (such
as environmental externalities) and no explicit role for regulation (such as price caps) or
1This excludes any general-equilibrium e¤ects which, for example, could arise due to interactions be-
tween supplier market power and imperfections in input markets (such as the labour market).
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other policy interventions.
The denition of welfare (W ) is mostly taken to be social surplus, that is, the
unweighted sum of aggregate consumer surplus (CS) and aggregate producer surplus ():
W = CS+. A consumer-welfare standard is highlighted in some places given that recent
antitrust policy in jurisdictions such as the US and EU is said to be geared more heavily
towards consumers.2
The results discussed cover a range of models with homogeneous products as well as
di¤erent forms of horizontal product di¤erentiation. Some of the homogeneous-products
results apply equally to settings with vertical di¤erentiation in which there are (known)
di¤erences in product quality across rms. Many of the models are aggregative gamesin
which a rms competitive environment can be captured using a single summary statistic
of rivalsactions.
These models have useful application across a wide array of industries. In the energy
sector, similar homogeneous-product models are widely employed in the analysis of elec-
tricity, natural gas and crude oil markets as well as energy-intensive industry such as
cement and steel. The di¤erentiated-price models covered form the basis for competition
policy in sectors with branded products.
1.3 Plan for the chapter
Section 2 presents the recent literature on the rate of cost pass-through as an economic
tool to understand the market performance and the division of surplus between buyers and
sellers. Section 3 discusses recent papers which quantify market performance in various
Cournot-style models using welfare losses, that is, the comparison between equilibrium
welfare and rst-best. Section 4 covers recent developments in the theory of oligopoly
with endogenous entry of rms, with a focus on the quantication of welfare losses and
the impact of rm heterogeneity. Section 5 gives concluding remarks and suggestions for
future research.
2See Farrell and Katz (2006) for a discussion of welfare standards in antitrust. Armstrong and Vickers
(2010) study a model in which a consumer-welfare standard can, for strategic reasons, be optimal even if
the regulator cares about total welfare (because the standard a¤ects the set of mergers that is proposed
by rms).
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2 Cost pass-through and the division of surplus
Consider the treatment of monopoly in a textbook on microeconomics or industrial orga-
nization. With linear demand and costs, the monopolist captures 50% of the (potential)
gains from trade, with 25% as consumer surplus and the remainder as deadweight loss.
So there is a ratio of 1:2 between consumer surplus and producer surplus.
Elsewhere, the textbook may turn to the question of cost pass-through: how much of a
unit tax is passed onto the market price? For a linear monopoly, the rate of pass-through
(P=MC) equals 50%. So there is a ratio of 1:2 between the price change and the cost
increase.
What textbooks do not say is that this is no coincidence. The ratio of consumer
to producer surplus, in equilibrium, is equal to the rate of cost pass-through in that
market. Weyl & Fabinger (2013) develop this insight more broadly, including for various
representations of oligopoly, and argue that pass-through is a versatile tool to think about
market performance.
Much earlier, Bulow & Peiderer (1983) noted how monopoly cost pass-through varies
with the shape of the demand curve, i.e., its curvature. Kimmel (1992) exploits this link
to frame the prot-impact of a unit tax in a Cournot oligopoly in terms of pass-through.
Anderson & Renault (2003) study the relationship between demand curvature and the
division of surplus under Cournot competition but do not explicitly cover pass-through.
Weyl & Fabinger (2013) tie together these various antecedents.
2.1 Monopoly case
Consider a monopolist which produces a single good with marginal cost c+ t, where t  0
is a parameter. The monopolist faces inverse demand p(Q); let D(p) be the corresponding
direct demand. At the optimum, marginal revenue equals marginal cost, MR(Q) = c+ t.
What is the impact of a small increase in t? Let   dp=dt denote the rate of cost pass-
through, which measures how price responds to a $1 increase in marginal cost.3 Denote
consumer surplus CS =
R1
p D(x)dx, and observe that dCS=dt =  Q, at the optimum.
Similarly, by the envelope theorem, the prot impact d=dt =  Q, since the indirect
3Another formulation, more frequently used in the international trade literature, instead concerns the
pass-through elasticity (dp=p)=(dt=t)  , which also incorporates the prot margin.
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impact of the tax is zero since the monopolist is optimizing. Hence the burden of an
innitesimal tax, starting at zero, is split according to
dCS=dt
d=dt

t=0
= (0),
where (0) is pass-through at the price corresponding to initial zero tax rate.
Consider now a discrete increase in the tax from t0 to t1 > t0. Write Q(t) for the
optimal quantity as a function of the tax. The changes in consumer surplus and monopoly
prots satisfy CSt1t0 =  
R t1
t0
(t)Q(t)dt and t1t0 =  
R t1
t0
Q(t)dt. Dene the quantity-
weighted pass-through over the interval [t0; t1] as 
t1
t0
 [R t1t0 (t)Q(t)dt]=R t1t0 Q(t)dt. Dene
t as the hypothetical tax rate at which the market is eliminated, that is, Q(t) = 0, and call
the average quantity-weighted pass-through rate   t0.4 Hence the surplus generated
from the markets birth(at t) to the equilibrium status quo (at t = 0) satises
CSt0
t0
=
R t
0(t)Q(t)dtR t
0Q(t)dt
=  =
CS

.
Consumer surplus is generated by the market at a rate of monopoly prots times the pass-
through rate, weighted over the inframarginal market quantities traded over the interval
[0; t]. This takes into account that the pass-through rate may not be a constant.
Intuitively, high pass-through means that price closely tracks marginal cost, so that
(i) the monopolists degree of market power is low, and, conversely, (ii) realized social
surplus is high and largely goes to consumers. With low pass-through, price follows
more closely consumers willingness-to-pay so the monopolist captures the bulk of the
gains from trade.
Bulow and Peiderer (1983) showed that monopoly pass-through satises:
(t) =
1
[2  (t)] =
slope of inverse demand p(Q)
slope of marginal revenue MR(Q)

Q=Q(t)
,
where (t)    [p00(Q)=Qp0(Q)]Q=Q(t) is the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand,
which is a measure of demand curvature. The common theory assumption (Bergstrom
and Bagnoli 2005) that direct demand D(p) is log-concave (i.e., logD(p) is concave in
4Some demand curves have t =1, though a nite choke price can be assumed.
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p), corresponds to   1, and hence to pass-through (weakly) less than 100%. Loosely
put, the monopolist then captures a greater share of the gains from trade than consumers.
For very concave demand,   0, the triangle left as consumer surplus is very small;
correspondingly the ratio CS= and pass-through  are both small as is the remaining
deadweight loss.
For many familiar demand curves, the ratio p0(Q)=MR0(Q) is constant, so pass-through
is a constant with (t) =  for all t 2 [0; t] and so the localproperties of demand are
also global. With linear demand, marginal revenue is everywhere twice as steep as
demand, so pass-through  = 12 . Other examples are constant-elasticity demand, for
which  = 1 + 1= > 1 (violating log-concavity) where    p(Q)=Qp0(Q) > 0 is the
price elasticity, and exponential demand D(p) = exp ((  p)=), for which  = 1 as it
is log-linear. In such cases, the marginal impact of a tax is equal to its average impact,
(dCS=dt)=(d=dt) = CSt1t0=
t1
t0
= CS= = .
The literature has found di¤erent ways of representing constanthigher-order proper-
ties of demand. First, using the concept of -concavity: demand D(p) is -concave if and
only if demand curvature (Q)  (1  ) (Anderson & Renault 2003). A -linear demand
curve thus has constant curvature  = 1   , and constant pass-through over its entire
domain. Second, the demand curve D(p) can be interpreted as arising from the values v
of a distribution F (v) of consumers with unit-demand, so 1 F (p) is the quantity sold at
price p. The inverse hazard rate is h(v)  [1  F (v)]=f(v) where f(v) is the density. The
monopolists rst-order condition (p c) = h(p), so pass-through is constant whenever the
inverse hazard takes the linear form h(v) = 0 + 1v. Third, Rostek, Weretka & Pycia
(2009) show that a distribution has a linear inverse hazard rate if and only if it belongs
to the Generalized Pareto Distribution, F (v) = 1   1 + ! (v   ) 1=!, where (; ; !)
respectively describe its location, scale and shape (with 0 = (   !) and 1 = !).
2.2 Oligopoly models
The preceding insights generalize to certain n-rm oligopoly models. Consider a general
reduced-form model of competition in which rm is prots i = (pi  c)qi and the Lerner
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index (price-cost margin) with symmetric rms is determined as:
"D
(p  c  t)
p
= ,
where  is a conduct parameterwhich measures the intensity of competition, and "D 
 p(Q)=Qp0(Q) is the market-level price elasticity of demand.5 The previous monopoly
analysis corresponds to joint prot-maximization with  = 1. This setup nests various
widely-used models of symmetric oligopoly, including the two following models:
Homogeneous-product oligopoly. Consider a Cournot model augmented with con-
jectural variations: when rm i chooses its output it conjectures that each other rm j
will adjust its quantity by dqj = [R=(n 1)]dqi. So the aggregate responses by all its rivals
is given by d(
P
j 6=i qj)=dqi = R. Cournot-Nash competition corresponds to R = 0 while
Bertrand competition in e¤ect has R =  1 (so the price stays xed). Conjectural varia-
tions can be seen as a reduced-form way of incorporating (unmodelled) dynamic features
of the game that rms play (Cabral 1995).
The rst-order order condition for rm i has MRi = p(Q) + qip0(Q)(1 + R) = c + t,
where Q  Pni=1 qi is industry output. This can be re-arranged to give the symmetric
equilibrium (with qi = Q=n):
"D
(p  c  t)
p
=
(1 +R)
n
= .
Thus a constant conjectural variation R corresponds to a constant conduct parameter .
Di¤erentiated-products price competition. Consider a model of price-setting compe-
tition with symmetrically di¤erentiated products. Firm is demand qi(pi;p i) depends on
its own price and those of its n  1 rivals. In symmetric equilibrium (with qi = q = Q=n),
the corresponding price can be written as p(q), which captures how each price changes in
response to a simultaneous change in all rmsoutputs.
The rst-order condition, at symmetric equilibrium, for rm i is given by the inverse-
elasticity rule, (p   c   t)=p =  (q=p)=(@qi=@pi). The elasticity of market demand is
5A large empirical literature reviewed by Reiss and Wolak (2007) has developed structural econometric
techniques for estimating the intensity of competition.
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"D =  (p=q)
Pn
j=1(@qi=@pj), and so:
"D
(p  c  t)
p
=
Pn
j=1(@qi=@pj)
@qi=@pi
= 1 +
P
j 6=i(@qj=@pi)
@qi=@pi
= 1 A = ,
where A is the diversion ratiofrom rm i to the rest of the industry as it raises its price
(Shapiro 1996).6 With a linear demand system, for example, A is constant and hence
the conduct parameter is also constant.
As in the monopoly case, the envelope theorem together with the symmetric demand
structure imply that the marginal impact of an increase in the tax rate on consumer surplus
is given by dCS=dt =  (t)Q(t). Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show that the marginal
impact on producers is given by d=dt =  [1 (t)(1  (t))]Q(t), where industry prots
 Pni=1 i. So the burden of an innitesimal tax, starting at zero, is split according to:
dCS=dt
d=dt

t=0
=
(0)
[1  (0)(1  (0))] .
This is a clean generalization of the monopoly case, with some intuitive properties. For
given pass-through (0), less competitive conduct (higher ) skews the division of surplus
from consumers to producers. For given conduct , higher pass-through favours consumers.
The pass-through rate is here given endogenously by:
(t) =
1
1 + (t) ["MCS + "]

Q=Q(t)
,
where "  d log (q)=d log q is the elasticity of the conduct parameters to changes in
output, and "MCS  d logCS0(Q)=d logQmeasures how responsive themarginal consumer
surplus CS0(Q) =  p0(Q)Q = [p(Q)  MR(Q)] (Bulow & Klemperer 2012) is to changes
in aggregate output.7 The pass-through rate, in general, must capture how both of these
metrics may vary as the tax a¤ects equilibrium quantities. For example, if the tax reduces
per-rm output (dq=dt < 0) and this makes the industry more competitive (d=dq >
0), then this will tend to enhance pass-through. Note also that pass-through depends
6With the symmetric demand structure,
P
j 6=i(@qi=@pj)
@qi=@pi
=
P
j 6=i(@qj=@pi)
@qi=@pi
.
7Note that d logCS0(Q)=d logQ = d logCS0(Q)=d log q given the symmetric setup.
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indirectly on the number of rms, since this will generally enter into (t).8
As in the monopoly case, it is possible to go from this local impact to the global
division of surplus by appropriately weighting how pass-through rates changes along the
demand curve.
With constant conductand constant curvature, the global division of surplus again
follows immediately from its local properties. As noted above, many oligopoly models
feature (t) =  so that " = 0. It is also instructive to write out "MCS = [1   (t)]
in terms of demand curvature. (Log-concave demand  < 1 corresponds to "MCS > 0 ,
CS00(Q) > 0.) With these modications, pass-through becomes  = 1= [1 + (1  )]Q=Q(t)
which nests the well-known Cournot-Nash oligopoly result (Kimmel 1992) when  = 1=n.
2.3 Discussion
The insight that the division of surplus is pinned down by the rate of pass-through has a
number of appealing features. First, it allows pass-through to be seen as a su¢ cient sta-
tisticfor welfare analysis. Second, pass-through estimates already exist in the literature
for many markets based on studies of taxation, exchange rates, and other cost shifts.
Third, it makes it easier to form intuitions about market performance since pass-through
rates are often easier to think about than higher-order properties of demand.
Information on pass-through can also be used in the reverse direction. For price com-
petition with di¤erentiated products, Miller, Remer & Sheu (2013) instead emphasize how,
assuming second-order demand properties (i.e., demand curvatures), the matrix of pass-
through rates across products can be used to estimate a matrix of rst-ordercross-price
elasticities. The attraction of this is that it sidesteps the problem of full-scale estimation
of the demand system which can be time-consuming or even infeasible.
While it is relatively easy to obtain empirical estimates of pass-through, it is more
di¢ cult to ascertain how pass-through itself varies along a demand curve. Yet, strictly
speaking, the theory requires the quantity-weighted pass-through   t0. MacKay, Miller,
Remer & Sheu (2014) show how reduced-form regressions of price on cost may not yield
reliable estimates of the rate of cost pass-through. Loosely put, such a regression can only
8For Bertrand competition (with   0), note that CS= = =(1 ) but also  = 1, so that CS=! 0
(since rms make zero prots).
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yield consistent estimates in situations where the underlying environment is such that cost
pass-through is constant over the range of prices in the data. Empirical implementation
of the theory may have to resort to assuming (t) =  for all (or large parts of) t 2 [0; t].
The above results are based on strong symmetry assumptions such as identical mar-
ginal costs and symmetrically di¤erentiated products. These greatly simplify the welfare
analysis but are likely to be violated in any oligopoly. Weyl & Fabinger (2013) also de-
velop results from a general model which allows certain types of asymmetries. Other
factors, such as the details of market structure, then come into play. Again, it is possible
to adjust the denition of pass-through to incorporate these but this means that estimat-
ing this adjustedpass-through rate becomes increasingly di¢ cult and begins to merge
into estimation of a full-scale market model. The power of pass-through is strongest for
monopoly.
Another assumption is that the number of the rmsin the market is xed, and hence
invariant to changes in costs. Ritz (2014b) shows that, with log-convex demand, a higher
unit-tax can induce additional entry into a market, and thus ultimately lead to a lower
market price. Negative pass-through, also known as Edgeworths paradox of taxation,
is ruled out in the models covered here. Conversely, a low pass-through rate can induce
exit of weaker rms which in turn causes price to jump back up.9
3 Quantifying welfare losses in Cournot-style models
Consider a textbook Cournot oligopoly with symmetric rms. How large are welfare
losses due to market power? With three rms, they equal 623%; in other words, a highly
concentrated Cournot triopoly delivers over 93% of the maximum possible welfare.10 For
a duopoly, the loss is 11% certainly not trivial, but not large either.
A recent literature quanties market performance directly in terms of realized welfare
(Corchón 2008; Ritz 2014). It shows that welfare losses in familiar oligopoly models are
often perhaps surprisingly small, and also shows what market factors can generate more
9Further aeld, in the context of the commercial banking industry, Ritz & Walther (2015) show how risk
aversion and informational frictions tend to dampen the pass-through of changes in interest rates across
loan and deposit markets.
10For a duopoly in which one rm is a Stackelberg leader, the welfare loss also equals 6 2
3
percent so
the social value of leadership is equal to one additional entrant.
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substantial losses.
The approach is based on calculating equilibrium welfare losses relative to the rst-best
benchmark. It turns out that this ratio can naturally be determined in terms of observable
metrics, notably rmsmarket shares. In this way, this literature is potentially useful also
for policy purposes as a simple initial screening tool for market performance.11
3.1 Cournot-Nash oligopoly
Consider a Cournot-Nash oligopoly with n  2 active rms. Firm i has marginal cost ci
and chooses its output qi to maximize its prots i = (p   ci)qi, where the price p(Q)
with industry output Q Pni=1 qi. Without loss of generality, rms are ordered such that
c1  c2  :::  cn. Inverse demand p(Q) =    Q1  is (1   )-linear with constant
curvature , where  < 2 gives downward-sloping industry marginal revenue. This also
ensures the uniqueness and stability of the Cournot equilibrium as well as a well-behaved
consumer-surplus function.
The rst-best outcome, which maximizes social welfare W  CS + , where  Pn
i=1 i, has price equal to the lowest marginal cost p
fb = c1 with output Qfb = p 1(c1) =
[(  c1)=]1=(1 ). Denote the corresponding welfare level as W fb.
The rst-order condition for rm i is MRi = ci, and the sum of rst-order conditionsPn
i=1MRi  [np(Q) +Qp0(Q)] =
Pn
i=1 ci pins down the equilibrium industry output Q
.
Hence the equilibrium price is given by:
[np   (1  )(  p)] =
Xn
i=1
ci =) p = (1  )+ nc
(n+ 1  ) .
This equilibrium pricing function p(c) is a¢ ne in the unweighted-average unit cost c 
1
n
Pn
i=1, so the pass-through of a cost change that a¤ects all rms equally   dp=dc =
n=(n+ 1  ) is constant (i.e., d2p=dc2 = 0).
Denote equilibrium welfare and consumer surplus under Cournot competition as W 
11An older empirical literature going back to Harberger (1954) estimates welfare losses normalized rel-
ative to sales revenue. A disadvantage is that magnitudes are hard to intepret; for example, the ratio of
equilbrium welfare to revenue can vary widely for reasons that have nothing to do with market power.
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and CS, and dene welfare losses relative to rst-best as:
L 

1  W

W fb

,
which is a unit-free measure of welfare that lies on the unit interval, L 2 [0; 1].
3.1.1 Symmetric rms
To build intuition, it is useful to begin with the benchmark case in which rms have
identical marginal costs, ci = c for all i; Anderson and Renault (2003) showed that:
L(n; ) = 1  n
1=(1 )(n+ 2  )
(n+ 1  )(2 )=(1 ) .
Equilibrium welfare losses depend only on the number of (symmetric) rms and the cur-
vature of demand. As expected, they decline with the number of rms and tend to zero
in the limit as the competitors grows large. This reects the classic result on convergence
to perfect competition in large markets.
Welfare losses also tend to zero if the curvature of demand is extreme, either as  ! 2
or as  !  1. The case with  ! 2 corresponds to very convex demand in which the total
revenue to rms (and hence the total expenditure by consumers) become constant and
thus invariant to the number of rms competing; since production costs are symmetric,
there is no other source of welfare losses. The case with  !  1 corresponds to demand
which becomes rectangular (innitely concave) so all consumers have identical WTP of 
for the good; then rms extract all the gains from trade with a uniform price p =  while
serving all consumers e¢ ciently. Consistent with the previous monopoly discussion, this
is the limit of zero pass-through, ! 0.
More generally, Corchón (2008) shows that welfare losses with symmetric rms tend to
be quite small. For example, with linear demand ( = 0) the above simplies to L(n) =
1=(n+1)2. So welfare losses are of order 1=n2 (as the price and output ine¢ ciencies are both
of order 1=n) and in a quantitative sense decline quickly as the number of competitors
rises, e.g., L(n)  4% if n  4. For non-linear demands, Corchón (2008) derives the
maximal welfare loss for a given number of rms, that is, bL(n)  max L(n; ). As long
12
as there are at least four rms in the market, overall welfare losses are never greater than
around 5.8%. In fact, the textbook case with linear demand generally yields fairly high
welfare losses.
3.1.2 Asymmetric rms
The symmetric case shows that welfare losses due to market power do not tend to be
large say well above 5% in Cournot-Nash models, except in some duopoly cases.
However the symmetry assumption switches o¤any role for welfare losses due to productive
ine¢ ciency. Indeed, it is well-known that Cournot equilibria are not cost-e¢ cient since
the lowest-cost rm does produce all output; high-cost rms serve too much of the market
(Lahiri & Ono 1988; Farrell & Shapiro 1990; Aiginger & Pfa¤ermayr 1997).12
More realistic results revert back to the case where rms marginal costs may be
asymmetric. The challenge that costs are typically di¢ cult to observe (or even reliably
estimate), while there is an advantage in having a welfare measure that depends on ob-
servables as far as possible. The trick to resolve this is to use the rst-order conditions to
substitute outcosts for market shares which are readily available for many markets.
In particular, let rm is equilibrium market share si  (qi =Q), and recall the rst-
order conditionMRi = p(Q)+qip0(Q) = p (1 )Q2 si = ci. Some rearranging shows
that its equilibrium market share satises:
(1  )(  p)si = (p   ci),
which provides a direct mapping between (observable) market share and marginal cost,
for a given p as determined above. Note that rm 1s market share s1 is the highest since
it has the lowest marginal cost, and s1  s2  :::  sn.
Based on this, Corchón (2008) shows that welfare losses with asymmetric rms are
given by:
L(s1; H
; ) = 1  [1 + (2  )H
]
[1 + (1  )s1](2 )=(1 )
,
where H   Pni=1 s2i fsi gni=1 is the Herndahl index of concentration, evaluated at the
12More generally, marginal costs are not equalized acrosss rms (as would occure in a cost-minimizing
allocation of any given industry production level).
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equilibrium market shares.13 The expression for welfare losses remains simple: they now
depend on s1 and the Herndahl index H, both of which previously boiled down to the
number of rms in the symmetric case.14 Intuitively, market performance under Cournot
is described by the Herndahl index while the largest market share captures how close
this performance is to rst-best for which it should equal 100%.
Welfare losses increase with the market share of the largest rm s1 (holding xed the
value of the Herndahl index). Intuitively, the largest rm must have an above-average
market share; further increasing its size relative to the market pushes the equilibrium
closer to monopoly.
Welfare losses decline in the Herndahl index (holding xed s1). While perhaps initially
counterintuitive, the reason for the results is that a higher industry concentration shifts
market share toward the more e¢ cient rms (which have lower costs). This mitigates the
productive ine¢ ciency of the Cournot equilibrium. The more general point is that the
Herndahl index is not a reliable guide to market performance.
Corchón (2008) shows that welfare losses in asymmetric Cournot models can be very
large. Specically, it is possible to nd combinations of demand conditions () and market
structure (s1; s2; :::; sn) which yields welfare losses which are arbitrarily close to unity,
L(s1; H; ) = 1    for a small constant  ! 0. At the same time, the Herndahl index
may be arbitrarily low. The worst case for welfare is when the non-largest rms are
symmetric, s2 = s3 = ::: = sn; then lim! 1 [limn!1 L(s1; n; )] = 1   s1, and clearly
H  0 while L  1 for s1 small.
Welfare losses can be substantially higher than in symmetric cases, even with non-
extreme assumptions about demand curvature and realistic market structures. As a nu-
merical example, let rmsmarket shares s1 = 40%, s2 = 30%, s3 = 20%, and s4 = 20%
which implies a Herndahl index H = 0:3. Assuming linear demand ( = 0), it follows
that welfare losses L(s1; H; )  18%. This is approximately three times as high as the
maximal loss with four symmetric rms.
Surprisingly, it is possible for market performance under Cournot to be worse than
13This expression simplies to the symmetric case where H = s1 = n
 1 for all i.
14Again, the demand parameters (; ) do not play any role: the inuence of  is subsumed in rms
market shares and  is merely a scale factor which does not a¤ect relative welfare losses. (All else equal,
doubling  halves both W  and W fb so their ratio is unchanged.)
14
for a monopoly. Corchón (2008) shows that with log-convex demand ( > 1), monopoly
indeed generates the highest welfare loss. However, with log-concavity ( < 1), the socially
worst outcome involves a highmarket share (at least 50%) for one rm combined with
a tailof very small rms. The intuition is that the small rms add little to competition
but substantially reduce productive e¢ ciency.
Finally, with asymmetric rms, market performance is no longer obviously related to
cost pass-through. Pass-through (n; ) reects the number of competitors and demand
conditions while welfare losses L(s1; H; ) also depend on the details of the distribution
of rmsmarket shares. Market performance can vary widely even for a xed underlying
rate of pass-through.
3.2 Endogenous competitive conduct in two-stage games
A signicant body of empirical evidence shows that many industrial markets have a com-
petitive intensity that is tougher than Cournot-Nash but falls short of perfect competition
(Bresnahan 1989). One way to model this, as in Section 2, is by adding an exogenous con-
duct parameter. Similarly, a widely-used class of two-stage strategic games comes with an
conduct parameter that is endogenously determined by the interaction of the two stages.
It turns out that welfare losses in such models can be much lower than in the standard
Cournot setup.
Consider the two-stage game introduced by Vickers (1985) and Fershtman & Judd
(1987). Each rm delegates decision-making in the product market to a manager. Manager
i receives an incentive contract which induces maximization of an objective function 
i =
(1 'i)i +'iRi, where Ri  pqi is the rms sales revenue. In the rst stage, each rms
shareholders choose the incentive weight 'i to maximize their rms prots i. In the
second stage, each rms manager chooses an output level qi to maximize the objective

i.
This setup reects extensive evidence that managers across a wide range of industries
appear to place signicant emphasis on measures of their rms size (Ritz 2008, 2014a).
This is particularly evident in competition for rankings in league tableswhich are based
on rmssales or market share, not prots and play a prominent role, for example, in
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commercial and investment banking as well as in car and aircraft manufacturing.15
Firms can use their Stage-1 choice of the incentive contract as a commitment device
to gain strategic advantage in the product market.16 Higher values of 'i constitute ag-
gressive output-increasing behaviour since they correspond to placing less weight on costs.
Aggressive behaviour is optimal when rms are competing in strategic substitutes since it
induces a soft response from rivals. From the rmsviewpoint, this leads to a prisoners
dilemma: each rm individually has an incentive to engage in aggressive behaviour but
this ends up making them collectively worse o¤.
Remark. The exposition here focuses on a widely-used two-stage model of delegation.
Yet the same welfare-conclusions apply to a range of other two-stage models which are
strategically equivalent. This includes the seminal model of Allaz & Vila (1993) in which
rms engage in forward trading of their production, hiring overcondentmanagers who
overestimate the state of market demand, and models of strategic trade policy in which
countries use output subsidies to commit to their rms to aggressive behaviour. (See Ritz
(2008, 2014a) for further discussion.)
The game is solved backward for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Manager is
rst-order condition in Stage 2 is given by:
@
i
@qi
= (1  'i)
@i
@qi
+ 'i
@Ri
@qi
=

p(Q) + p0(Q)qi   (1  'i)ci

= 0.
This implicitly denes manager is best response in the product market. Let qi ('1; '2; :::; 'n)
denote the Nash-equilibrium output choice, as a function of all rmsincentive contracts.
Given this, in Stage 1, each rms shareholders choose their managers incentive weight
according to:
di
di
=

p(Q) + p0(Q)qi (1 +  i)  ci
 dqi
d'i
= 0,
where  i  (dQ i=dqi)fqi gni=1 < 0 is the aggregate response of rivalsQ i 
P
j 6=i qj
and dqi =d'i > 0. Combining the two rst-conditions, the contract places places positive
15There is also a large body of evidence which shows that executive compensation in manufacturing,
service and nancial industries often rewards measures of rm size in addition to prots.
16 It is assumed that such commitment is credible; a su¢ cient condition for this is that managers
contracts are observable and cannot be renegotiated.
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weight on sales revenue 'i > 0 if and only if 

 i < 0. This corresponds to a conduct
parameter for rm is product-market behaviour; the only di¤erence is that  i is here
determined endogenously in Stage 1.17
Ritz (2014a) shows that, with linear demand,  i =  (n   1)=n < 0 for all i, and
equilibrium welfare losses are given by:
eL(n; s1; H) = 1  n(n+ 2H)(n+ s1)2 .
The market share of the largest rm and the Herndahl index play similar roles as in
Cournot-Nash ( i  0); the di¤erence is that the number of rms now also plays a
crucial role because it determines the endogenous competitive intensity as per  i.
With symmetric rms, welfare losses then become eL(n) = 1=(n2 + 1)2. Losses are now
of order 1=n4, and thus vanish extremely quickly as the number of rms rises. In e¤ect,
n rms now behave like n2 Cournot competitors; even in a duopoly, losses are only 4%.
The reason is that the conduct becomes endogenously more competitive with more rms;
in addition to having Cournot with more rms, Cournot becomes more like Bertrand.
Intuitively, there is more scope to manipulate rivalsbehaviour if they are more numerous.
With asymmetric rms, the key point is that, given more intense competition, lower-
cost rms capture larger market shares than under Cournot-Nash.18 Turned on its head,
this means that a weaker rm can sustain a given market share only if its cost disadvantage
is less pronounced than under Cournot-Nash. This additional e¢ ciency e¤ect strongly
limits welfare losses.
Ritz (2014a) shows that welfare losses now remain small (less than 5%) for many
empirically relevant market structures. A simple su¢ cient condition is that the market
share of the largest rm is no larger than 35%. Welfare losses are always small if rms are
17 Instead using a di¤erentiated-products Bertand model in which prices are strategic complements would
lead to rms choosing to place negative weight on sales revenue ('i < 0), which seems at odds with
empirical observation. In related work, Miller and Pazgal (2001) show that the equilibrium outcomes (and
hence welfare) under di¤erentiated Cournot and Bertrand can be identical if delegation contracts instead
take the form of relative prots, e.g., 
i = i   ij (for a xed n = 2). While competition is as such
tougher under Bertrand, this is exactly o¤set by the soft equilibrium contract featuring i < 0 while
i > 0 under Cournot (strategic substitutes).
18Boone (2008) pursues this logic to develop a novel measure of competition based on how the relative
prots of an e¢ cient and a less e¢ cient rm diverge more stronger when competition is more intense.
Also related, Aghion and Schankerman (2004) study the welfare impacts of policies designed to enhance
competition, and the political economy of their support, in a di¤erentiated-products model with asymmetric
costs.
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not too symmetric or are su¢ ciently numerous (both in contrast to Cournot-Nash). In
the numerical example with s1 = 40%, s2 = 30%, s3 = 20%, and s4 = 20%, welfare losses
are just below 5% (instead of 18% under Cournot-Nash). These insights also extend fairly
widely to non-linear demand systems.19
3.3 Discussion
The above welfare quantications hold equally if rmsproducts are vertically di¤erenti-
ated in the eyes of consumers, due to (known) di¤erences in quality. In particular, if rm
i faced a demand curve pi = i + p(Q) where i is a measure of vertical product di¤er-
entiation, then the rst-best has the rm with the highest value-added, maxi fi   cig,
produce all output. At equilibrium, higher-quality rms tend to have too small market
shares from a social viewpoint. However, like cost di¤erentials, di¤erences in product
quality are fully captured in rms observed market shares, allowing for welfare to be
estimated.
Welfare losses, in practice, will be lower if the rst-best outcome is not the relevant
benchmark for comparison. For example, the most e¢ cient rm may not be apply to
supply qfb because of capacity constraints or the government intervention that would be
required to achieve rst-best itself causes other welfare-reducing distortions. Welfare losses
relative to any second-best optimum will be smaller.
These models can also speak to merger analysis. For example, as long as the post-
merger market structure is su¢ ciently symmetric under Cournot-Nash or the largest rm
has market share of less than 35% with delegation, then welfare lossesremain small even
after one or several mergers.20 In this sense, the welfare impact of the mergers is limited,
and there may be little rationale for policy intervention. Note that this is a di¤erent
perspective from the usual approach in merger analysis: instead of testing whether or
not a merger reduces in welfare, it focuses on whether the level of welfare losses remains
smallpost merger (regardless of the direction of change).
19 In related work on restructured electricity markets, Bushnell, Mansur & Saravia (2008) emphasize how
retail-market commitments by vertically integrated players play a similar role to forward sales in Allaz &
Vila (1993) and how such long-term commitments can substantially improve market performance.
20Strictly speaking, this assumes that the underlying rst-best welfare remains una¤ected by the merger;
this will be the case either if the most e¢ cient rm is not involved in the merger, or if it does not experience
any e¢ ciency gains.
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Conversely, welfare losses would be higher if either the mode of competition in the in-
dustry is (tacitly) collusive or if the approximate welfare standard is skewed more strongly
toward consumers, e.g., W =  + CS with  < 1. Cournot-style equilibria with very
concave demand (low cost pass-through) often produce high W but only low CS and
hence possibly also low W.21 For example, Cournot-Nash equilibrium with linear de-
mand yields CS=W fb = 1=(1 + s1)2, so consumer losses due to market power will be
substantial and sometimes very large unless the largest rm is itself small relative to
market.22
Other strands of the literature develop related models with endogenous conduct which
may have similar welfare properties that lie between Cournot-Nash and perfect competi-
tion. One example is supply function models in which rms choose a set of price-quantity
pairs to supply rather than being restricted to price or quantity choices (Klemperer &
Meyer, 1989; Green & Newbery, 1992). In more recent work, DAspremont, Dos Santos
Ferreira & Gerard-Varet (2007) and DAspremont & Dos Santos Ferreira (2009) develop a
related way of endogenizing conduct parameters. Although welfare results for some limit-
ing cases and specic examples are known, I am not aware of any general welfare analysis
for such models.23
The nding that welfare losses due to market power are often quantitatively modest in
Cournot-style models naturally leads to the question: What other market features could
generate higher losses? One possibility is horizontal product di¤erentiation which confers
additional market power on rms (Corchón & Zudenkova 2009). Another possibility is
welfare losses due to di¤erent forms of asymmetric information. Vives (2002) studies a
symmetric (Bayesian) Cournot model in which rms have private information on their
costs, and argues that informational losses can outweigh those due to classical market
power. Its e¤ect on deadweight losses is of order 1=n while that of market power is of
order 1=n2. Put di¤erently, a larger number of rms is more e¤ective at curbing market
power than reducing informational distortions. It would be interesting to know more about
21This may explain why policymakers often appear to have a distaste for low pass-through markets;
while these often yield low deadweight losses, consumers typically capture only a small fraction of the
gains from trade.
22This formula can be obtained heuristically by setting  = 0 and H = 0 in the expression for
L(s1; H
; ); superimposing a zero Herndahl in e¤ect takes away industry prots.
23Holmberg and Newbery (2010) study how deadweight losses vary with market structure, demand
elasticity and capacity utilization in a application of the supply-function approach to electricity markets.
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how such e¤ects play out with (ex ante) rm heterogeneity.24
4 Social costs of endogenous entry
Recent work provides several renements to the classic result that, in symmetric oligopoly,
there is a tendency towards excess entry: more rms enter than would be chosen by a
social planner (Mankiw & Whinston 1986).25
In the long run, rms decide endogenously on whether to enter a market (at some
cost, which is sunk). Amir, De Castro and Koutsougeras (2014) show for Cournot models
that excess entry arises if and only if there is business stealing: each entrant, to some
degree, captures sales from incumbents rather than serving new customers; per-rm output
satises q0(n) < 0.
Hence there is wedge between private and social incentives: some of an entrants
prots are a transfer from incumbent rms but yield no social gain; since entry is costly,
this wedge matters for welfare. In free-entry equilibrium, each individual rm is too small
from a social perspective.26
4.1 Quantifying welfare losses due to excess entry
Most of the existing literature examines a second-best setting in which the social planner
cannot inuence post-entry pricing, and focuses on qualitative results. In more recent
work, Corchón (2008) quanties the welfare losses L arising in a symmetric Cournot free-
entry equilibrium, relative to the rst-best social optimum in which a single rm enters
and price equals marginal cost. Welfare losses under free entry are sometimes very large,
24 In recent work, Gabaix, Laibson, Li, Li, Resnick & de Vries (2016) highlight how price-cost margins
(rather than welfare) under (symmetric) monopolistic competition can be much less sensitive to the number
of rms than under Cournot. They show that, in a random utility model in which goods are homogenous
but consumers are a¤ected by random Gaussian tasteshocks, markups are asymptotically proportional
to 1=
p
ln(n). One interpretation is behavioural: consumer confusionnot captured in standard models
of imperfect competition may result in signicantly higher prices even in largemarkets.
25Taken literally, the policy implication is that entry should be regulated or otherwise restricted. By
contrast, under perfect competition the degree of entry by rms is welfare-optimal; more entry is then
always a good thing for society.
26The same conclusions applies with a moderate degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation, so each
entrant adds only little extra variety of value to consumers. However the result can be reversed, leading
to insu¢ cient entry, if competition in the market is very tough (e.g., undi¤erentiated Bertrand), even
though at most by one rm too few(Mankiw & Whinston 1986). In recent work, Bertoletti & Etro (2016)
unify many existing results from endogenous-entry models (with symmetric preferences and symmetric
rms), covering Bertrand, Cournot, and monopolistic competition.
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even with symmetric rms, because of the further cost misallocation.
Similar to the previous section, the approach is based on observables as far as possible.
Assuming a free-entry equilibrium, the number of rms n is observed from market data.27
The xed cost of entry K are obtained as follows. (This can also be thought of as a
xed investment cost or R&D outlay required for market entry.) Let (n) denote per-rm
Cournot prots (where 0(n) < 0). Since the nth rm decided to enter, K  (n)  Kmax,
while the (n + 1)th rm staying out implies that K > (n + 1)  Kmin. (This assumes
a su¢ ciently large pool of potential entrants.) So the entry cost is bounded according to
K 2 (Kmin;Kmax].
It is clear from Mankiw & Whinston (1986) that welfare losses are increasing in the size
of the entry cost; indeed the social ine¢ ciency disappears as the entry cost becomes small.
Therefore, L(n;K; )  L(n;Kmax; )  Lmax and L(n;K; ) > L(n;Kmin; )  Lmin,
where  is the familiar measure of (constant) demand curvature.
The limiting cases are instructive. First, with a large number of observed entrants in
the industry, welfare losses tend to zero. In such cases, operating prots are driven down
to almost zero, so the entry cost must have been tiny to have allowed so many rms to
participate. Hence the outcome is essentially equivalent to perfect competition.
Second, with a very convex demand curve ( ! 2) industry prots are only a very
small fraction of the overall surplus generated. Hence the entry cost sustaining n rms in
the market cannot be very large, and so welfare losses are again tiny.
Third, and conversely, with a very concave demand curve ( !  1), industry oper-
ating prots are very large relative to consumer surplus. So if some potential entrants
nonetheless chose not too enter, then the xed cost must be substantial and so there is
a lot of socially wasteful cost outlay. Indeed, if the xed cost is large enough to wipe out
all industry prots, then welfare losses tend to 100%. Specically, Corchón (2008) shows
that Lmin = (n  1)=n  12 while Lmax = 1.
This latter set of cases is interesting because it contrasts so strongly with a xed
number of rms. With exogenous n, welfare losses under symmetric Cournot tend to zero
as  !  1; the incentive for rms to withhold output disappears as they capture all
27This side-steps the problem of the integer constraint on n that arises when the number of rms is
derived from market primitives on costs and demand.
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surplus at the margin. By contrast, with endogenous n, the majority of this surplus is
dissipated by xed costs.
To get a feel for how welfare losses remain large in interior cases, consider the
case with linear demand. Using the results in Corchón (2008), it is easy to check that
Lmin(4)  21:8% while Lmax(4) is just over 30%. This is at least 57 times as high
as the loss of 4% with an exogenous four rms. For a larger number of rms, the gap
[Lmax(n)  Lmin(n)] shrinks as per-rm prots decline. With ten rms, welfare losses are
bounded by 13.516.0%; they remain above 5% until the number of rms exceeds 35.
4.2 Firm heterogeneity and endogenous entry
More recent work on endogenous entry has relaxed the assumption that potential entrants
are symmetric, allowing for di¤erences in rmsmarginal costs and in the timing of market
entry. By contrast, classic models of excess entry leave no room for competition to
enhance productive e¢ ciency via selection and thus deprive it of one of its fundamental
roles.
Vickers (1995) develops a simple Cournot example with unit-elastic demand (i.e.,
p(Q) = S=Q with xed industry revenue S) to illustrate how the adverse e¤ects of entry
may thus be overstated. Suppose that each rm discovers its unit cost (low or high) fol-
lowing entry; the industry already consists of three rms; the question is on the welfare
impact of a fourth entrant.
If the entrant ends up being high-cost and at least two incumbents are low-cost, then
it nds it optimal to not produce, so the externality from entry is zero. Even if only one
incumbent is low-cost, the negative externality is less pronounced than under symmetry
since business stealing mainly a¤ects the high-cost incumbent.
The entry externality turns positive if two of the three incumbents are high-cost; entry
by a low-cost rm then induces one of the less e¢ cient incumbents to quit, and the
e¢ cient incumbent again expands output post-entry.28 Surprisingly the literature does
not appear to have generalized this example to richer market structures or to di¤erent
forms of competition.
28The unit-elastic example is somewhat unusual in that an e¢ cient incumbent regards rivalsoutputs as
a strategic complement.
22
Etro (2008) shows how a rst-mover facing endogenous entry of followers typically
behaves more aggressively than under simultaneous moves, and how this is good for
social welfare. This stands in contrast with Stackelberg leadership against a xed number
of rms, which is well-known to be critically sensitive to the question of strategic substi-
tutes (which leads to aggressive behaviour and a rst-mover advantage) versus strategic
complements (which yields a second-mover advantage).
Intuitively, endogenous entry means that the leadersattention shifts from away from
the reactions of followers at the margin (are strategies substitutes or complements?) to
how its behaviour a¤ects entry, that is, their participation constraints. Since products
are substitutes, more aggressive behaviour (more output or lower prices) always leads to
a favourable response: rivalsnon-entry (or exit) becomes more likely.
To illustrate, consider quantity competition one leader and m potential followers. De-
mand is linear p(Q) = 1 Q and costs are zero apart from the entry cost K.29 The key
point is that, with free entry of followers determined by a zero-prot condition, the number
of actual entrants decreases with the leaders output. Etro (2006) shows that the equilib-
rium thus features strategic entry deterrence; the market leader produces qL = 1  2
p
K,
which prevents any entry, and the limit price is p = 2
p
K.
This simple example already has some interesting welfare implications. The price is
higher than in the free-entry Cournot equilibrium (simultaneous moves), so consumers are
worse o¤ contrary to the xed-n Stackelberg logic. However, social surplus is nonetheless
higher because of the prots made by the leader which are associated with the saving
on entry costs. The observed market structures are radically di¤erent: the market has
ipped from n active rms with identical shares to a single quasi-monopolist.
Etro (2008) studies a general aggregative gamein which each rms prots depend on
its own action and a summary statistic of those of its rivals combined, that is, rm is payo¤
i = (xi; X i) K where xi is its own action (e.g., price or output) andX i =
P
j 6=i h(xj)
captures the externalitiesarising via the actions of other players, where h(); h0() > 0.
This setup nests as special cases quantity competition with di¤erentiated products as well
as price competition with logit and iso-elastic demand, amongst others. Typically the
29As is standard, the entry cost is assumed to be su¢ ciently low such that the market is not a natural
monopoly. Both Nash and Stackelberg free-entry models converge to perfect competition as K ! 0.
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leader produces more than under simultaneous moves or prices lower than the followers;
this achieves a Pareto improvement in the allocation of resources.
The general implication is that large market shares of leading rms in an industry can
be good news for social welfare; this also restores the notion of a rst-mover advantage
that prevails under both price and quantity competition. The details of a Stackelberg
free-entry equilibrium depend on rmsstrategic variables (price or quantity), the nature
of product di¤erentiation, and the shape of their cost functions.30
Mukherjee (2012) builds on these insights to show that the excess entryresult can
be reversed in markets with leadership and endogenous entry. The model has a single
leader which enjoys a unit cost advantage relative to a tail of symmetric followers, and
a linear homogeneous-products demand curve. The analysis is again second-best in that
the social planner chooses the number of followers taken as given that they will engage in
Stackelberg competition with the leader post-entry.
The main novelty is a business creatione¤ect: the leaders optimal response to an
increase in the number of followers is to raise production, dqL=dn > 0. The reason is that
its output rises with the followerscost, and does so more stronger if there are more of
them. Intuitively, the leader meets more rivals with a ghting responsewhich leverages
its cost advantage. (More formally, the leaders optimal output is supermodular in its cost
advantage and the number of follower-entrants.)
The key insight is that the excess-entry result is reversed if the leaders cost advantage
is su¢ ciently pronounced. Then the new business-creation e¤ect dominates the standard
business-stealing e¤ect (which still exists amongst the followers), and more followers than
delivered by the market would be socially desirable.
4.3 Discussion
The welfare metric used in the literature on endogenous entry is social surplus, so that the
productive ine¢ ciency arising from excess entry counts. Instead using consumer welfare,
30Anderson, Erkal & Piccinin (2015) analyze the welfare impacts of changes that a¤ect only a subset
of rms a market such as a merger or a technology change in a general aggregative-game setup. They
show that the short-run impacts (e.g., a merger raises prices) of the change are often fully neutralized in
the long-run with endogenous entry (i.e., the merger has no impact on prices). The key condition is that
the marginal entrants, who make zero prots, are not directly a¤ected, e.g., by the merger and their
actions e¤ectively pin down the behaviour of the aggregate (and hence prices) over the long run.
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an extra entrant is always socially desirable as long as it reduces prices; the market, if
anything, delivers insu¢ cient entry.31
The additional welfare losses that arise with endogenous entry thus have a similar
e¤ect to placing less weight on consumer surplus in the social-welfare function. Lowering
 in W =  +CS pays less attention to prots either for normative reasons or because
these prots are dissipated in another way. Incorporating wasteful rent-seeking costs which
rms incur in securing market power (Posner 1975) has similar e¤ects.
A central conclusion is that surplus losses remain large with endogenous entry even with
a considerable number of rms in the market. Again, this conclusion can be substantially
altered in two-stage models of competition. When post-entry competition is more intense,
the inferred entry cost for any given number of observed entrants is well below that of
Cournot competition, and so the additional source of cost misallocation is also much
smaller. Welfare losses already drop below 5% whenever there are at least 46 observed
entrants (Ritz 2014a).
Models of excess entry make the (sometimes neglected) assumption that entry occurs
sequentially. While this is often reasonable, there are other examples in which a potential
entrant may not know what entry decision other rms have made. Cabral (2004) provides
a second-best analysis in which entry is a simultaneous process and either happens imme-
diately or takes time as in a war of attrition. If entry costs are fairly low, then the results
from sequential models are fairly robust. However, with high entry costs, the details on
the timing of the entry process become important and insu¢ cient entrymore likely:
from a societal perspective, a rm may be too fearful of an entry mistake(more rms
enter than the market can support).
Finally, Kremer & Snyder (2015) emphasize a related source of welfare losses which
arises from under-entry. Suppose that there is only a single potential entrant and that,
from a social standpoint, it would be e¢ cient for this rm to invest. However, if this
rm is unable to appropriate a su¢ ciently large fraction of the surplus as prots, it will
choose not to enter; as a result, the market does not come into existence.32 Kremer &
31Some exceptions to this baseline result are known. Chen & Riordan (2008) show how more rms can
sometimes lead to higher prices in a discrete-choice model with product di¤erentiation; see also Cowan &
Yin (2008) who study a related Hotelling setup.
32By contrast, the above models consider the welfare implications of endogenous entry where some entry
has indeed occured so there exists an observed distribution of rmsmarket shares.
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Snyder (2015) provide worst-case bounds which take into account the possibility of such
zero entry, and argue that the resulting welfare losses can be large for instance, in the
pharmaceuticals industry in which consumersvaluations for products often vary widely.
5 Conclusion
The recent literature o¤ers some new perspectives on a signicant body of existing knowl-
edge on oligopolistic competition and social welfare.
In a fairly broad class of oligopoly models, the division of surplus between rms and
consumers is importantly determined by the rate of cost pass-through. Empirical estimates
of pass-through across di¤erent markets thus o¤er indirect inference on welfare metrics.
Yet pass-through is not a panacea in settings with rm heterogeneity, and the link be-
tween theory and the econometrics of pass-through still needs further tightening in future
research.
The degree of welfare loss in widely-used Cournot-style models is often surprisingly
modest, even relative to rst-best and with signicant industry concentration. Under
Cournot-Nash competition, losses can be signicantly higher due to cost asymmetries be-
tween rms yet their adverse impact is strongly limited in two-stage models with tougher
competitive conduct. Losses are also typically much higher under a consumer-welfare stan-
dard. Future research could examine more closely the interaction between heterogeneity
in rms costs and asymmetric information.
Market performance is similarly reduced in dynamic models featuring excess entry
which dissipates a signicant fraction of rm prots. Recent work has extended these
results to allow for Stackelberg leadership as well as di¤erences in rmscosts. Both can
be good news for social welfare, especially if the market leader also enjoys a cost advantage.
Future research may focus on how these results map onto the empirical study of specic
markets.
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